The Gentrification of Public Higher Education - Part 13

Displaced to Where?

A great question!  A reader of last week’s blog post posed the above question to me on Facebook, no doubt prompted by last week’s concluding paragraph:

“Accordingly, of the 11,270 students displaced (a euphemism for students denied a PASSHE education):

6,334 of those displaced students were White;

2,320 of those displaced students were Black;

1,899 of those displaced students were Hispanic;

707 of those displaced students were Other.”

To answer the reader’s question, it is necessary to point out that we don’t know the names of the more than 11,000 less-affluent PASSHE students who were “displaced” between the years 2002 and 2011.

Nor do we know the names of an equal number of more-affluent students who replaced them in many hundreds of classrooms across the fourteen PASSHE universities.  That is because of FERPA (The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act), a Federal law protecting the privacy of student education records.

And because we don’t know their names, there is no way of knowing where those 11,000 students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds may have gone after being displaced from PASSHE universities.

But we may safely infer that students from less-affluent families who couldn’t afford PASSHE tuition would have few options for a four-year college degree.  Two-year community colleges might be one option for those students, but Pennsylvania with 67 counties has only 38 public community colleges.

As to the best answer to the question “Displaced to Where?

I would suggest this: “Displaced to a life of uncertainty, hardship and limited educational options.”   

The Why Question

Having pondered the “Where Question,” as related to the displacement of less-affluent students, one may also ask an even more pressing question: “Why are less-affluent PASSHE students being displaced?

The easy answer is: “Because the PASSHE Board of Governor has implemented a gentrification policy.”

More fundamentally: “Why has the PASSHE Board of Governors implemented a gentrification policy?”

The answer to that question may be straightforward but it requires some background information.

Background

For the past twelve weeks we’ve been looking into the gentrification of public higher education in Pennsylvania and across America.  It is a national phenomenon in which so-called “public” higher education is witnessing an enormous shift in the demographics of its student body and, particularly, in the annual incomes of families sending their sons and daughters to so-called “public” universities.

The data show that enrollment by students from more-affluent families is rapidly growing while enrollment by students from less-affluent families is steadily shrinking.  When such demographic shifts occur, it is common to characterize them as a “displacement” of the less-affluent by the more-affluent.

That sort of displacement is occurring in “public” higher education for the most basic of all reasons: The more-affluent families can easily afford “public” higher education; and the less-affluent families cannot!  So enrollments by more-affluent students increase while those from less-affluent students decrease.

Note that the key to that decision is the “cost” that individual students must pay for admission.  In this case the “cost” of admission is not the posted tuition (“sticker price”), but rather the actual and often variable (“bottom line”) cost to the student.    

In the genteel world of private higher education, colleges and universities practice “tuition discounting,” a policy that permits academically qualified students from less-affluent families an opportunity to enroll thanks to “institutional scholarships.” This form of financial aid is funded by the difference between the institution’s posted annual tuition and the institution’s average annual cost to educate one student.

For financial reasons, tuition discounting is sustainable only when the tuition (“sticker price”) is higher than the average annual cost to educate one student for one year.  The families of academically qualified students who can afford to pay the full sticker price do so; while families of similarly qualified students who cannot afford to pay the full sticker price are provided with “institutional scholarships” funded by the dollar difference between sticker price and average annual cost to educate one student.      

In the cutthroat world of “public” higher education, as currently provided by the 14 PASSHE universities, only low levels of tuition discounting are permitted by current Board of Governors’ policy.  As a result of this policy decision, many poor students can’t afford PASSHE’s tuition, while wealthy students can more than afford it.  The net result is that many poor students get shut out of public higher education, and a growing number of wealthy students are getting inducements—unneeded State subsidies—to fill seats left empty by the absence of students that public higher education in Pennsylvania was created to serve.

Question: Was PASSHE gentrification the intended—or unintended—consequence of those decisions?

Answer:  Having watched the 100% political control of the PASSHE system and its 14 universities over the past 20+ years, I am persuaded that gentrification is actually the intended result of Board of Governors' decisions.

Why Would the PASSHE Board of Governors Adopt Policies that Encourage Gentrification?

The answer to this question flows inescapably from the following facts: 

1.       Since 2002, the PASSHE Board of Governors has been totally subservient to the political best interests of the sitting Pennsylvania Governor, whether Democrat or Republican.

2.       “Politics” for politicians is all about “getting and keeping power in a government,” according to Merriam-Webster.

3.       Money is the key to “getting and keeping power in a government,” according to Jesse Unruh, author of the famous quote (“Money is the mother’s milk of politics”).

4.       Politicians are always looking for affluent individuals to serve as donors to their political campaigns.

5.       Quartile 4 parents of PASSHE students (average annual income $135,677) are a much better bet for campaign donations to politicians than Quartile 1 parents (average annual income of $17,873)!

Sad to say, when it comes to politics, it appears to be all about the money.

To be continued.

The Gentrification of Public Higher Education - Part 12

More Details About the Victims of PASSHE Gentrification

Last time we estimated that between 2002 and 2011, some 11,270 of PASSHE’s less-affluent (Q1 & Q2) students (who in 2011 accounted for two-thirds of all PASSHE students) were displaced by 11,270 of PASSHE’s more-affluent (Q3 & Q4) students (who then accounted for one-third of all PASSHE students).

The PASSHE universities include Bloomsburg, California, Cheyney, Clarion, East Stroudsburg, Edinboro, Indiana, Kutztown, Lock Haven, Mansfield, Millersville, Shippensburg, Slippery Rock and West Chester.

During the nine year period, the percentage of less-affluent students in PASSHE’s total student body fell from 80% to 67%, as the percentage of more-affluent students grew from 20% to 33%.

These figures reveal what the rapid gentrification of PASSHE universities looks like in terms of numbers.   

The four Quartiles of annual family incomes of PASSHE students have the following ranges and averages:

Quartile 1 has a family income range from $0 to $40,000, with an average of $17,863.

Quartile 2 has a family income range from $40,000 to $69,999, with an average of $54,817.

Quartile 3 has a family income range from $70,000 to $99,999, with an average of $83,816.

Quartile 4 has a family income range from $100,000 or higher, with an average of $135,677.

Having already estimated the number of victims of PASSHE gentrification between 2002 and 2011, we will now estimate the racial and ethnic breakdown of those 11,270 less-affluent PASSHE students who were displaced by an equal number of more-affluent PASSHE students.

A Definition of “Poverty”

While the terms “less-affluent” and “more-affluent” are very relative, the income ranges and averages for the four quartiles listed above allow one to connect PASSHE family income statistics with public data on National and State poverty rates by race and ethnicity. 

For example, according to an interactive U.S. Census Bureau website¹ entitled “Poverty thresholds by Size of Family and Number of Children,” the Federal “poverty level” in 2011 was defined by the Census Bureau in terms of a sliding scale of annual family incomes ranging from $17,916 to $43,487, depending on the number of adults and the number of children under age 18 living there.

Note that this poverty range overlaps the “above average” portion of PASSHE’s Q1 range!  This means that the “below average” portion of PASSHE’s Q1 range falls far below Federal “Poverty Threshold,” and yet in Pennsylvania, those students can’t go to college because of the PASSHE Gentrification Policy.

Recall that this policy is a direct consequence of the PASSHE Board of Governors’ Act 188-defying focus on the “lowest possible tuition” (i.e., sticker price), rather than on the Act 188-mandated “lowest possible cost to the students” (i.e., bottom line).

PASSHE’s Gentrification Policy is a cruel consequence of a lawless decision.  And because the Board of Governors refuses to follow the law, there is too little tuition discounting to save those students.   

Poverty Rate by Race/Ethnicity in America

According to a 2014 study² by the Kaiser Family Foundation, the United States had 47 million people (or 15% of the total U.S. population that year) in poverty.

Of those 47 million: 20 million (10%) are White: 10 million (26%) are Black; 13 million (29%) are Hispanic; and 4 million (15%) are Other.

The above poverty numbers add up to 47 million total people in poverty in the U.S., as they must.  But the percentages do not add to 100%.  The reason is that the individual percentages refer not to the size of the U.S. population, but rather to the size of the population of each racial/ethnic subgroup.

That is:

20 million Whites (10% of the White population in the U.S.) were in poverty in 2014;

10 million Blacks (26% of the Black population in the U.S.) were in poverty in 2014;

13 million Hispanics (29% of the Hispanic population in the U.S. were in poverty in 2014; and

  4 million Other (15% of the Other population in the U.S. were in poverty in 2014.

To see a more detailed racial/ethnic breakdown, click the attached link to a helpful pie-chart.³

Poverty Rate by Race/Ethnicity in Pennsylvania

The same Kaiser Family Foundation report cited earlier also lists the poverty rate data for all fifty states, including Pennsylvania.² That is:

1.6 million Pennsylvania citizens (13 percent of Pennsylvania’s total population) were in poverty in 2014;

900,000 Whites (9% of the White population of Pennsylvania) were in poverty in 2014;

327,000 Blacks (25% of the Black population of Pennsylvania) were in poverty in 2014;

267,000 Hispanics (29% of the Hispanic population of Pennsylvania) were in poverty in 2014;

99,600 Other (13% of the Other population of Pennsylvania) were in poverty in 2014.³

Racial/Ethnic Breakdown of PASSHE Gentrification Victims

Note from the previous discussion that of the 1.6 million Pennsylvania citizens in poverty in 2014:

900,000 (56.3%) were White;

327,000 (20.6%) were Black;

267,000 (16.9% were Hispanic; and

99,600 (6.3%) were Other.

The above percentages reflect the relative shares of Pennsylvania’s racial/ethnic minorities who are in poverty.  Those same percentages—applied to the total number (11,270) of less-affluent students displaced by PASSHE Gentrification between 2002 and 2011—should provide a good estimate of the impact of PASSHE gentrification on the various segments of the less-affluent PASSHE population:

Accordingly, of the 11,270 students displaced (a euphemism for students denied a PASSHE education):

6,334 of those displaced students were White;

2,320 of those displaced students were Black;

1,899 of those displaced students were Hispanic;

707 of those displaced students were Other.

Despite their racial and ethnic differences, all of those students had two important things in common: 1) They were college ready; and 2) They couldn’t afford a PASSHE education due to cruel, conscious and law-defying policy decisions made by the PASSHE Board of Governors.  

To be continued.

¹ http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html.

² http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.   

³ images.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search.

The Gentrification of Public Higher Education - Part 11

The Victims of PASSHE Gentrification

Virtually every word in the dictionary has “synonyms,” that is words that carry roughly the same meaning; but many words have few if any “antonyms,” that is words that carry an opposite meaning.

For example the word “victim,” defined as “someone or something sacrificed or preyed upon,”  has thirty-six synonyms but only two antonyms—“criminal” and “culprit”—according to Thesaurus.com.¹

“PASSHE gentrification” has been defined as “the displacement of less-affluent students by more-affluent students in PASSHE classrooms.”  The existence of gentrification trends at public universities across America generally has been documented since the 1990s.²  The existence of gentrification at PASSHE universities was first documented by Chart 21 in my book, Privatization Without a Plan in 2013.³  
 

In previous blog posts we have focused primarily on the “culprits” behind “PASSHE Gentrification,” that is, the elected and appointed officials who control every aspect of the PASSHE system of 14 universities.

The PASSHE universities include Bloomsburg, California, Cheyney, Clarion, East Stroudsburg, Edinboro, Indiana, Kutztown, Lock Haven, Mansfield, Millersville, Shippensburg, Slippery Rock and West Chester.

Synonym and Antonym

The words “benefit” and “detriment” form a perfect synonym/antonym pair:  Each is the antonym of the other!  Just as there must be a culprit for every victim; there must also be a benefit for every detriment.

Question: “Who are the victims of PASSHE gentrification?”  Or equivalently, “To whom is PASSHE gentrification detrimental?”

Answer:  A closer look at Chart 21³ by means of a small spreadsheet⁴ answers that question:

Between 2002 and 2011, the pace of gentrification at a typical PASSHE university (depicted by Chart 21) increased dramatically as seen from the following figures:

In the span of those ten years (with nine changes), the percentage of less-affluent PASSHE students (from the bottom two quartiles of annual family income) fell from 80% to 67%.

At the same time, the percentage of more-affluent PASSHE students (from the top two quartiles of annual family income) grew from 20% to 33%.    

A shift from 80%/20% to 67%/33% is clearly huge, but the true impact of what PASSHE gentrification is doing to the majority (67%) of PASSHE students is best seen in the dollars, rather than the percentages.

Quartile 1 has a family income range from $0 to $40,000, with an average of $17,863.

Quartile 2 has a family income range from $40.000 to $69,999, with an average of $54,817.

Quartile 3 has a family income range from $70,000 to $99,999, with an average of $83,816.

Quartile 4 has a family income range from $100,000 or higher, with an average of $135,677.

To get a sense of how many less-affluent students have been displaced by more-affluent students from 2002 to 2011, one needs to convert the percentages in Chart 21 into numbers by using total enrollment for each of the years.  An attached spreadsheet⁵ calculates those figures.  They are summarized below:  

1.       421 Quartile 1 students were displaced by more affluent students between 2002 and 2011;

2.       384 Quartile 2 students were displaced by more affluent students between 2002 and 2011;

3.       167 Quartile 3 students displaced less affluent students between 2002 and 2011; and

4.       639 Quartile 4 students displaced less affluent students between 2002 and 2011.

In total then, 805 (421+384) Q1 and Q2 students were displaced by more affluent students;

And 805 (167+639) Q3 and Q4 students displaced the less affluent students. 

Since these data represent the gentrification figures for just one PASSHE university whose size was intermediate among the other thirteen PASSHE universities, the total gentrification figures for PASSHE as a 14-university system would come to approximately 11,270 (805 x 14).  

From 2002 to 2011, some 11,270 less-affluent PASSHE students were displaced by an equal number of more-affluent PASSHE students.  Since it took place over ten years (nine changes), the average annual loss of less-affluent students (and gain of more-affluent students) was about 1,250 per year (11,270/9).

Between 2002 and 2011, some 11,270 of PASSHE’s less-affluent (Q1 & Q2) students (who in 2011 accounted for about two-thirds of all PASSHE students) were displaced by some 11, 270 of PASSHE’s more-affluent (Q3 & Q4) students (who in 2011 accounted for about one-third of all PASSHE students).

Who are the Beneficiaries of PASSHE Gentrification?

 

The beneficiaries are clearly the approximately one-third of PASSHE students who come from PASSHE’s more-affluent (Q3 & Q4) families, with average annual incomes of $83,816 and $135,677 respectively.

PASSHE’s gentrification policy—which is based on its Act-188 defying “low-tuition-for- all” policy, and which makes tuition-discounting impossible—is giving Q3 and Q4 students an unneeded  State subsidy!

While the Q3 and Q4 students are beneficiaries of the Board of Governors’ gentrification policy, they are not the culprits previously identified as one of the antonyms to the victims of PASSHE gentrification.  

Who are the Culprits behind PASSHE Gentrification?

The culprits are clearly the elected and appointed members on the PASSHE Board of Governors who since 2002 have ignored the Act 188 statutory purpose of the fourteen PASSHE universities which is: “To provide high quality education at the lowest possible cost to the students.”

Instead they have provided steadily eroding quality education at the “lowest possible tuition (sticker price)” rather than at the lowest possible cost to the students (bottom line), as per Act 188.

These culprits are also major beneficiaries of their own Act-188 defying PASSHE gentrification policy.  High elected officials get campaign donations from their political supporters, and in return, some political supporters get appointments to various State boards including the PASSHE Board of Governors. And as we saw last time, some of the highest ranking political appointees on the PASSHE Board of Governors have managed to “grab” multi-million dollar contracts with PASSHE universities, meeting or exceeding the definition of “Legal Corruption.”

A Word about the Victims of PASSHE Gentrification

Students from Pennsylvania’s least-affluent families are condemned to one of two terrible fates:  1) years of crushing student-loan debt for students lucky enough to gain admission despite substantial financial obstacles; or worse 2) the inability to even attend a PASSHE university because the BOG’s gentrification policy creates financial obstacles for them that are simply too enormous to overcome.

      Students in group 1) will have their lives and future prospects diminished, or at least postponed, by their student-loan debt, though in time they may be able to overcome such setbacks and achieve their dreams.  But the college-prepared students in group 2) who are being denied access to a college education—not because of academic deficiencies but rather because of insurmountable financial obstacles—will find their lifetime opportunities few, and their future prospects bleak.

To be continued.

¹http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/victim.

²http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/PolicyPublications/Policy%20Matters%20Tuition%20Discounting.pdf.   

³https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/7971151/privatization-without-a-plan-chart-21-and-caption-march-26-2016-pdf-191k?i=2196127.

⁴ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/8189417/passhe-gentrification-data-fy-2002-to-fy-2011-august-19-2016-pdf-133k.

⁵ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/8189436/passhe-gentrification-figure-estimates-2002-to-2011-august-19-2016-pdf-25k.

The Gentrification of Public Higher Education - Part 10

The Connection between Pennsylvania Corruption and PASSHE Gentrification

Recent blog posts have focused on illegal and legal corruption in Pennsylvania as the source of the institutional corruption at the PASSHE system of fourteen universities.  However, the overall heading for our last ten blog posts has been “PASSHE Gentrification,” which is defined as the displacement of less-affluent students by more-affluent students, in PASSHE classrooms.

The PASSHE universities include Bloomsburg, California, Cheyney, Clarion, East Stroudsburg, Edinboro, Indiana, Kutztown, Lock Haven, Mansfield, Millersville, Shippensburg, Slippery Rock and West Chester.

The source of PASSHE’s institutional corruption is found not in the 14 universities but rather in PASSHE’s  fifteen governance bodies—especially the Board of Governors and to a lesser extent in the fourteen Councils of Trustees—which operate principally to advance political rather than educational goals.

The connection between Pennsylvania corruption and PASSHE gentrification requires the establishment of two separate links: 1) the link between State legal corruption and PASSHE institutional corruption; and 2) the link between PASSHE institutional corruption and PASSHE gentrification.  We start with Link 2.

The Link between PASSHE Institutional Corruption and PASSHE Gentrification

This link is easy to establish based on the definition of “institutional corruption” which involves, as shown earlier, the presence of “a systemic and strategic influence that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose.”

PASSHE’s Act 188 statutory purpose¹ is “To provide high quality education at the lowest possible cost to the students.”  But compelling evidence, based on official PASSHE documents, shows that the PASSHE Board of Governors has utterly failed to deliver that statutory purpose to PASSHE students since 2002.²

That failure by the PASSHE Board of Governors establishes: a) that PASSHE meets or exceeds the definition of “institutional corruption;” and b) that the Board of Governors is the source of the influence that is diverting PASSHE from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose.

With its January 2014 “Strategic Plan 2020: Rising to the Challenge,” the PASSHE Board of Governors has brazenly stated—contrary to law—that PASSHE is no longer about the Students, but about the System.³

Having replaced PASSHE’s student-centered purpose with its own narcissistic, system-centered purpose, the Board of Governors caused all sorts of abuses to follow—of which PASSHE gentrification is just one.

By ignoring the term “at the lowest possible cost to the students,” the Board of Governors opened wide the door to PASSHE gentrification!  Why?  Because if ‘lowest possible cost to the students’ is no longer a PASSHE goal, then PASSHE’s policies will automatically encourage enrollment from the more-affluent students (who can afford it), and discourage enrollment from less-affluent students (who can’t afford it).  

The Link Between Pennsylvania Legal Corruption and PASSHE Institutional Corruption

Recall the following definition⁴ from the Harvard report: “We define legal corruption as the political gains in the form of campaign contributions or endorsements by a government official, in exchange for providing specific benefits to private individuals or groups, be it by explicit or implicit understanding.”

Recall also that, when it comes to legal corruption,” Pennsylvania is one of the seven Most Corrupt States in America, suggesting at least some “government officials” in Pennsylvania are happy to “provide specific benefits to private individuals” in exchange for “campaign contributions or endorsements.”

Question: But how does that translate into institutional corruption at PASSHE? 

Answer: Metaphorically speaking, politics is the umbilical cord between State corruption and PASSHE institutional corruption.  That is, the same elected officials engaging in legal corruption at the State level are also appointing and influencing governance board members at all State agencies, including PASSHE.

While getting an initial appointment to a PASSHE governance board seat might be the quid pro quo for a first campaign donation, board members need to remain politically subservient to those same elected officials if they wish to be reappointed when their terms inevitably expire.   And the evidence shows that many political appointees remain at PASSHE for many, many, many years, suggesting that these board members are politically wedded to the elected officials who appointed and continue to reappoint them.

The political subservience that keeps PASSHE BOG leaders in their seats ensures that “what’s best for elected officials” will also be what’s best for the Board of Governors—and let the students be damned.

How else to explain the Board of Governors’ focus on lowest possible tuition (i.e., sticker price) instead of on the lowest possible cost to the students, (i.e., bottom line), a focus that guarantees gentrification?            

Governors of both parties since 2002 have enforced PASSHE’s “low tuition for all policy,” thanks to the political subservience of PASSHE BOG leaders who owe their reappointments to those same governors.

Governors from both parties endorse and enforce PASSHE’s low tuition-for-all policy for the best of all possible reasons; they benefit from it.

As shown in Privatization Without a Plan,² governors of both parties benefit politically from low PASSHE tuition rates, and their political appointees are eager to deliver below-market rates despite the negative consequences on PASSHE students—of which gentrification is just one of many.

Follow the Money

Question: How do most PASSHE governance board members get their seats on the Board of Governors or on one of the fourteen Councils of Trustees?

Answer:  By giving political donations (money) to elected officials who control access to those seats.

Question:  What do the individuals seeking those seats want in return for their political donations?

Answer:  It can vary, but based on my 20 years working inside PASSHE, perks and/or money top the list.

Question: But how can political supporters who give money to elected officials get their money back or perhaps even better, get a more lucrative “return on their investment?”

Answer:  The same flawed and dictionary-defying definition of “conflict of interest” found in the Pennsylvania Ethics Act allowing “legal corruption” by elected officials is also available to enable the political appointees of those elected officials to engage in some legal corruption as well. 

If it exists, it is possible

         Anonymous

Clear evidence for legal corruption by two high-ranking members of the PASSHE Board of Governors appeared in a June 30, 2012 article⁵ in The Tribune Review with the following headline:  “Pa. university board members grab $14M in contracts.”  Mr. Pichini was then and remains today the Chair of the PASSHE Board of Governors, and Mr. Pennoni was then a Vice-Chair of the PASSHE Board of Governors.

To be continued.

¹ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/6772880/act188-pdf-405k.

² https://www.amazon.com/Privatization-Without-Plan-Leadership-Pennsylvania/dp/1491295244.

³ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/7490741/strategic-plan-2020-rising-to-the-challenge-10-14-pdf-2-1-meg.

⁴ http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-american-states-some-results-safra.

⁵https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/7471137/tribune-review-article-pa-university-board-members-grab-14m-in-contracts-july-1-2012-pdf-2.

The Gentrification of Public Higher Education - Part 9

Illegal Corruption, Legal Corruption, and Institutional Corruption in Pennsylvania

Recall that a recent (2014) Harvard University report¹ on corruption in the fifty states concludedthat, when it came to “Illegal Corruption,” Pennsylvania was one of the six Most Corrupt States in America.

When it came to “Legal Corruption,” that same report concluded that Pennsylvania was one of the seven Most Corrupt States in America.

According to the Harvard report, illegal corruption and legal corruption are examples and part of a larger form of corruption known as “institutional corruption,” (Emphasis added), which is defined as follows:

Institutional corruption “is manifest when there is a systemic and strategic influence which  is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.”

To say illegal corruption and legal corruption are examples and part of a larger form of corruption means that the “institution” in this case could only be the “Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,” in the person of its Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches, each of which is separately ranked by the Harvard report.  

Recall that the essence of institutional corruption is the undermining or weakening of the institution’s purpose.  That is, the illegal and legal corruption ascribed to Pennsylvania suggests that Pennsylvania itself has had it its “purpose” undermined or weakened” by a systemic and strategic influence.

To complete the thought: To say that the institution known as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is corrupt is to say that its leadership in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches have permitted or enabled “a systemic and strategic influence” to undermine or weaken Pennsylvania’s purpose.  And that purpose is presumably the one specified in the Pennsylvania Constitution.

It is not farfetched to say that Pennsylvania’s leadership across all three branches of State government not only permitted or enabled a systemic and strategic influence to undermine/weaken Pennsylvania’s purpose; that leadership itself must be the source of the systemic and strategic influence in question.

This brings us full circle: Reports of Illegal and legal corruption in “Pennsylvania” place a stain on the State’s name when, in fact, it is the leaders of the three branches of State government who must share responsibility as the ultimate sources of Pennsylvania’s poor report card in the Harvard study.

Institutional Corruption at PASSHE

In recent blog posts, we chose the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as the unit of analysis for our look into illegal, legal and institutional corruption.  The reason for starting there is that a great deal of independent research has been conducted, and reports published, on corruption at the State level.

But to my knowledge, there has never been an independent or systematic study done with regard to institutional corruption at the level of individual universities, or even systems of universities.

But in the case of PASSHE, sufficient public information exists to support an overwhelming case to the effect that: 1) The institution known as the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (PASSHE) meets or exceeds the definition of “institutional corruption” cited above; and 2) The PASSHE Board of Governors—and specifically its Act 188-defying policy decisions—is the obvious source of the systemic and strategic influence that is undermining and weakening PASSHE’s purpose, which is “To provide high quality education at the lowest possible cost to the students.”

PASSHE is a system of fourteen universities which include Bloomsburg, California, Cheyney, Clarion, East Stroudsburg, Edinboro, Indiana, Kutztown, Lock Haven, Mansfield, Millersville, Shippensburg, Slippery Rock and West Chester.

The Connection Between State Level Corruption and PASSHE Institutional Corruption

Metaphorically speaking, the connection between these two levels of corruption is “politics.”

That is, politics is the umbilical cord between State corruption and PASSHE’s institutional corruption.

Merriam-Webster defines “politics” as “activities that relate to influencing the actions and policies of a government or getting and keeping power in a government.”

The activities described in the first part of this definition refer to the role played by citizens trying to influence the policy choices which their government may require them to live and work under.  

But the second part of the definition refers not to citizens but to politicians and their political supporters who are well known to focus almost entirely on “getting and keeping power in a government.”

Question: And how do politicians get and keep power in a government?   Answer:  Follow the money!

“Money is the Mother’s Milk of Politics”

Jesse M. Unruh (1922-1987)

According to his New York Times obituary on August 6, 1987, Jesse Unruh was “a flamboyant Democratic politician who for a time wielded national influence from his base in California government.”

Although his famous quote about the powerful connection between politics and money was made fifty years ago, experience teaches that his insight has never been truer than it is today.

Interestingly, Unruh’s quote fits perfectly into the definition of “Legal Corruption” provided in the Harvard University report on corruption across America:        

Legal Corruption

“We define legal corruption as the political gains in the form of campaign contributions or endorsements by a government official, in exchange for providing specific benefits to private individuals or groups, be it by explicit or implicit understanding.”   (Emphasis added.)

Legal Corruption involves a conspiracy among elected officials that may span many years and involve many different elected officials along the way.  The essence of legal corruption is to “define corruption down” so that definitions of key terms such as “conflict of interest” in the law are very different from the dictionary definition of that term.  A good example might be the Pennsylvania Ethics Act² which first took effect on January 1, 1979, and was subsequently amended in 1989, 1998 and 2006.

For an analysis of the dictionary-defying definition of “Conflict of Interest” in the Pennsylvania Ethics Act, see the op-ed³ published in the Harrisburg Patriot News on March 8, 2013.   

Few if any of the politicians involved in passing that law back in 1979 are still in office or still alive today.  But today’s politicians, although not involved in writing that language, nevertheless continue to benefit from the language in that law, are not about to repeal the law, or even attempt to close its loopholes.

To be continued.

¹ http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-american-states-some-results-safra.

² http://www.ethics.pa.gov/Ethics-Act/Ethics-Act/Documents/Ethics%20Act%20(PDF).pdf.

³ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/6732130/harrisburg-patriot-op-ed-angelo-armenti-jr-march-8-2013-pdf-157k.

The Gentrification of Public Higher Education - Part 8

Institutional Corruption Defined

As we saw in last week’s blog post, institutional corruption…

“is manifest when there is a systemic and strategic influence which  is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.”  (Emphasis added.)

We will look at the PASSHE system of fourteen universities—and especially the governance of that system by the Board of Governors in Harrisburg and the fourteen Councils of Trustees at the individual PASSHE campuses—by focusing on Board of Governors’ decisions in light of the above definition.

The fourteen universities include Bloomsburg, California, Cheyney, Clarion, East Stroudsburg, Edinboro, Indiana, Kutztown, Lock Haven, Mansfield, Millersville, Shippensburg, Slippery Rock and West Chester.

PASSHE’s Ability to Achieve its Purpose

The essence of the above definition of institutional corruption involves an institution’s “ability to achieve its purpose.”  To begin with, it goes without saying that, if an institution is actually achieving its purpose, its leadership could never be legitimately accused of engaging in institutional corruption.

But conversely, if an institution is clearly failing to achieve it purpose, its leadership can legitimately be suspected of engaging in institutional corruption.

As we will show, a suspicion of institutional corruption is clearly warranted in the case of PASSHE’s leadership decisions since the year 2002, and continuing right up to the present moment.

The Purpose of the PASSHE System of Fourteen Universities

The purpose of the PASSHE system of fourteen universities is specified in its enabling legislation, Act 188 of 1982, Section 20-2003-A, Purposes and General Powers, which reads¹ as follows:

“(a) The State System of Higher Education shall be part of the Commonwealth’s system of

higher education. Its purpose shall be to provide high quality education at the lowest

possible cost to the students.”   (Emphasis added.)

Compelling evidence for PASSHE’s failure to achieve its statutory purpose since 2002 may be seen in the two attached charts: The first chart² shows that during the first thirty years of PASSHE’s existence between 1984 and 2013, PASSHE’s educational quality has been steadily declining since 2002; the second chart³ shows that a PASSHE education is not being delivered by the Board of Governors to PASSHE students at anything like the lowest possible cost to students.

Detailed discussion of the evidence behind these assertions is found in Privatization Without a Plan: A Failure of Leadership in Pennsylvania Public Higher Education.⁴

A Systemic and Strategic Influence

The above definition of institutional corruption also includes reference to “a systemic and strategic influence…that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose.”

In PASSHE’s case, the BOG’s Act 188-defying decision-making since 2002 has been providing the “systemic and strategic influence that undermines PASSHE’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose,” which is to provide “high quality education at the lowest possible cost to the students.”

The Board of Governors exerts absolute control over the PASSHE system of fourteen universities in ways that are both “systemic and strategic.”

BOG control is systemic in that the fourteen PASSHE presidents report on a daily basis, not to their local Council of Trustees, but to the PASSHE Chancellor—who reports directly to the Board of Governors.

BOG control is strategic in that the overall direction of the PASSHE universities is dictated by the Board of Governors, who directs the Chancellor to direct the presidents to follow the BOG’s strategic plan.

 PASSHE’s History Regarding Strategic Plans

For PASHE’s first 25 years of existence (1984 to 2009), the Board of Governors operated with a series of strategic plans that were sufficiently detailed to provide all PASSHE stakeholders with guidance as to where PASSHE was headed, and what everyone’s role in that ambitious educational journey would be.    

But as described in previous blog posts, the PASSHE Board of Governors then operated for some five years (2009 to 2014) with no strategic plan whatsoever!

During those years, the fourteen universities experienced a period of organizational “drift” during which the PASSHE presidents, I included, were left with little idea of what direction we were to pursue or which major goals we were to achieve. 

Then after five years with no strategic plan, on January 23, 2014 the PASSHE Board of Governors suddenly announced its new 16-page plan⁵ entitled “Strategic Plan 2020: Rising to the Challenge.” 

PASSHE’s New “Purpose” Defies Act-188 and Espouses a Totally Different Direction and Set of Goals

Recall that PASSHE’s statutory purpose from Act 188 is to provide “high quality education at the lowest possible cost to the students.”  Recall also that there is compelling evidence that the Board of Governors has failed to deliver Act 188’s statutory purpose to the PASSHE students since 2002.

Prior to 2014, all of PASSHE’s previous strategic plans, including “Leading the Way” which expired in 2009, were faithful to Act 188’s purpose of “high quality at the lowest possible cost to the students.”

But the Board of Governors’ new “Strategic Plan 2020” avoids any mention of those ten words!

PASSHE’s Strategic Plan “2020: Rising to the Challenge” portends a future more sinister than drift alone—this plan ignores Act 188’s statutory vision and replaces it with its own narcissistic vision:

“The Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education seeks to be among the nation’s leading systems of public universities recognized for (1) excellence, relevance, and value in education; and (2) responsiveness to regional, state, and national needs through its programs, service, scholarship, and research.”²

Note that the word “student” never appears in the PASSHE Board of Governors’ new Vision Statement!

The Board of Governors has made it official—the fourteen universities are no longer about the PASSHE students; they are about the elected and appointed officials who control them.

To be continued.

¹ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/6772880/act188-pdf-405k.

² https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/6794551/privatization-without-a-plan-chart-9-and-caption-january-23-2014-pdf-387k.

³ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/6802256/privatization-without-a-plan-chart-20-and-caption-january-29-2014-pdf-390k.

⁴ https://www.amazon.com/Privatization-Without-Plan-Leadership-Pennsylvania/dp/1491295244.

⁵ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/7490741/strategic-plan-2020-rising-to-the-challenge-10-14-pdf-2-1-meg.