Monday, December 8, 2014

The ‘Gives’ and ‘Gets’ of Political Patronage at the 14 PASSHE Universities

An Unusual Example of Game Theory with Three Players

Last week we considered a very unusual example of game theory with three players.  The three players included Elected Officials (EO), their Political Supporters (PS), and the “Majority Stakeholders” (MS) at the 14 PASSHE universities, i.e., the Students, Parents, and Private Donors, primarily PASSHE Alumni, who provide a majority (75%) of PASSHE’s annual operating funds, while the State provides 25%.
 
This particular example of game theory with three players is unusual for several reasons.
 
First, if this were a normal game, each player would have the option of either cooperating with, or competing against, one or both of the other two players.  And it is this very “freedom to choose” that creates the expectation that there must be three different ways in which “Two-Against-One” could be played in this case, namely: MS + EO against PS; MS + PS against EO; and EO + PS against MS.
 
Recall that in all our previous examples of game theory with three players at both the national and state levels, it was always possible to document the existence of real examples of all three “Two-Against-One” scenarios.  But, as we will see, that is not the case here.  In only one of those scenarios has evidence emerged to confirm it actually happens.  The other two scenarios remain just theoretical possibilities.     
 
The only “Two-Against-One” scenario that has actually manifested itself in this particular game is the one in which Elected Officials (EO) and their Political Supporters (PS) work together at the expense of the Majority Stakeholders (MS).  The other two options, while theoretically possible, have apparently never occurred as yet.  At a later time, we will come back to look at these other two possibilities, but for now we will provide the evidence for the one “Two-Against-One” scenario that is clearly known to exist.
 
Evidence for the “EO + PS against MS” Scenario

By the very nature of the “Two-Against-One” scenario from game theory with three players, the two players that work together at the expense of the third invariably engage in transactions in which each party gives something of value to the other—and gets something of value from the other in return.  

For example, when State-level Democrats and Republicans work together to provide the votes needed for bipartisan passage of raises or pension increases for themselves, each political party gives something of value to the other party.  They give their votes to support something that both political parties want.  The value of what they are giving is seen in the potential cost to those who cast votes they know will be extremely unpopular with the electorate.  It sometimes happens that legislators get voted out of office the next time around when their election challenger from either political party makes a major campaign issue of their “voting record,” and especially any unpopular votes that they may have cast.  
 
But by accepting the risk of retaliation at the ballot box by the electorate at the next election, both parties, and the legislators from both parties, get what they wanted—raises and pension increases!  
 
Elected Officials and their Political Supporters are in League Against the Majority Stakeholders
 
Powerful evidence exists to document the EO + PS against MS scenario cited in the above heading.  To see how it all works, one must look at what each of three players gives and gets in return:

What Political Supporters Give

Political Supporters, as the name implies, give political support to those Elected Officials with whom they hope to form or maintain a mutually beneficial relationship.  In most cases, the giving occurs with the hope and understanding that they will get something of value in return for what they give.  The actual support can take the form of a personal financial contribution, and/or “bundling” (i.e., securing donations for the candidate from one’s friends and colleagues), and/or working at the polls or otherwise helping elected officials, or candidates for elective office, to get elected and reelected again and again.
What Political Supporters Get
 
We know from the definition of political patronage that elected officials have the power “to make appointments to government jobs or grant other favors to their supporters.”  Political Supporters therefore hope and expect to get either “government jobs” or “other favors” from Elected Officials.
 
In the case of EO + PS against MS, both types of transactions involving either “government jobs” or “other favors” are very common.  For example, Governors whose terms of office are winding down routinely employ great political pressure to “place” key departing staff members—the epitome of political supporters—in high-paying jobs in, for example, PASSHE’s Office of the Chancellor.  In my 20-year experience as a PASSHE university president, I saw a number of former staff members of both Democratic and Republican outgoing Governors suddenly appear on the Chancellor’s Office payroll.
 
More problematic for the Majority Stakeholders are the political supporters who secure seats on the PASSHE Board of Governors (BOG) or a Council of Trustees (COT) at one of the 14 PASSHE universities.  What political supporters get in this case ranges from public recognition on the one hand to political or financial gain on the other.  One extreme example of apparent financial gain was documented by a June 30, 2012 Tribune-Review article¹ with headline:  Pa. university board members grab $14M in contracts.”

But many other conflicts of interest—according to the Merriam-Webster definition—are routinely seen in the political appointments to the BOG and the 14 COT’s by Governors from both parties.  But thanks to the “Pennsylvania Ethics Act” of 1978, conflicts of interest are defined in that law by means of a “non-dictionary definition” of the term² which conveniently helps to make unacceptable behavior acceptable.
 
To be continued.

¹ https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/7425061/tribune-review-article-pa-university-board-members-grab-14m-in-contracts-july-1-2012-pdf-2.
² https://www.keepandshare.com/doc/6939770/aa-op-ed-in-harrisburg-patriot-pennsylvanias-flawed-definition-of-conflict-of-interest-march-8.

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