What's the point of elections if everything is already decided? - Part 5

Political Patronage and the Fourteen PASSHE Universities

 
Before exploring the negatives of a political patronage system governing Pennsylvania’s “public” universities, recall the Webster’s College Dictionary definition of political patronage: “The power of public officials to make appointments to government jobs or grant other favors to their supporters.”
 

The Power of Public Officials to Make Appointments to Government Jobs

This first part of the definition of political patronage is very familiar and rarely questioned, primarily because it is so logically compelling even when questioned.  Most people can readily accept the idea that a new U.S. president, or new State governor, should be able to nominate cabinet members and other high officials to help the new chief executive implement the strategic vision and policy goals publicly promised to the voters during the election campaign by the ultimately elected candidate.       
 

The Power of Public Officials to Grant Other Favors to Their Supporters

This second part of the definition of political patronage is less familiar and even more rarely questioned because it operates almost totally below the radar, which is to say, in secret.  Unlike the process for the appointment of cabinet members and other high officials—which is a public process because the Senate confirmation process is a public process often accompanied by intense media coverage—the process of “granting other favors to their supporters” must ideally occur out of sight of the public and the media.

“You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”

 
Don’t tell the children, but there is considerable evidence that our elected officials at various levels of government are in the practice, if not the business, of granting favors to their supporters, and that’s only half the story.  According to The Free Dictionary, the familiar idiom “You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours,” translates to “You do a favor for me and I'll do a favor for you,” and more particularly, “If you do something for me that I cannot do for myself, I will do something for you that you cannot do for yourself.”

Question 1: What is it that political supporters (PS) desire to do that they cannot do for themselves?

Answer 1: For one, they clearly can’t grant themselves desired favors that only elected officials (EO) have the capability to provide.

 
Question 2: And what is it that elected officials (EO) desire to do that they cannot do for themselves?

Answer 2: For one, they clearly can’t grant themselves desired favors that only political supporters (PS) have the capability to provide.

 
These two questions and answers suggest even more interesting questions and answers:

Question 3: What do political supporters (PS) want from their elected officials (EO)?  

Question 4: What to elected officials (EO) want from their political supporters (PS)?

 
Answer 3: Political supporters of elected officials, it is safe to say, want perquisites—the synonyms for which include privileges, gratuities, freebies, bonuses or advantages.  The nature of those perquisites can range from public recognition on the one hand to political or financial gain on the other.
 
Answer 4: Elected officials want power and control beyond that which comes automatically by virtue of election to office.  By definition, they use political patronage to appoint individuals to government jobs having salary and benefits—and those individuals then owe their allegiance to the elected officials who appointed them.  Elected officials also provide other favors to their political supporters by using political patronage to appoint individuals to various public governing boards that may not provide salary and benefits but do cover all expenses associated with membership on that particular governance board.
 
In this way elected officials can “leverage” their influence over more and more government entities, through their influence over the people whom they appoint to the governance boards of those entities.
 
Note the transactional nature of the interactions between elected officials (EO) and their political supporters (PS). 
 
These are classic transactions in which each party gives something to the other—and gets something from the other in return.  Next week we will consider some “Gives” and “Gets” for each of the willing parties to these transactions, as well as some consequences for the many victims of these transactions.
                                                              

Game Theory with Three Players - Redux

In earlier blog posts we discussed the issue of “Game Theory with Three Players” for the special case in which the three players included Democrats (D), Republicans (R) and the Electorate (E).  Also discussed was the fact that there are three different ways to play “Two-Against-One” in any game with three players namely, in this case: E + D against R, E + R against D, and D + R against E. 

 
The beautiful symmetry involving players EO and PS suggests a Two-Against-One game in which third parties—who will be disadvantaged by the collaboration of these first two—have yet to be identified. 
 
But anyone who has studied the governance of PASSHE by its Board of Governors (BOG) and 14 PASSHE Councils of Trustees will quickly identify the third party being disadvantaged by the “Two-Against-One game being played by Pennsylvania’s elected officials (EO) together with their political supporters (PS).
 
The disadvantaged third parties are “PASSHE’s Majority Stakeholders,” that is, the PASSHE students, parents and private donors, primarily alumni, who currently provide 75% of the annual revenue that supports both the BOG, the Office of the Chancellor in Harrisburg, and the 14 PASSHE universities.   
 
To be continued.